We introduce an algebraic approach to Dynamic Epistemic Logic. This approach has the advantage that: (i) its semantics is a transparent algebraic object with a minimal set of primitives from which most ingredients of Dynamic Epistemic Logic arise, (ii) it goes with the introduction of non-determinism, (iii) it naturally extends beyond boolean sets of propositions, up to intuitionistic and non-distributive situations, hence allowing to accommodate constructive computational, information-theoretic as well as non-classical physical settings, and (iv) introduces a structure on the actions, which now constitute a quantale. We also introduce a corresponding sequent calculus (which extends Lambek calculus), in which propositions, actions as well as agents appear as resources in a resource-sensitive dynamic-epistemic logic.
Introduction
Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) is a PDL-style logic to reason about epistemic actions and updates in a multi-agent system. It focuses in particular on epistemic programs, i.e. programs that update the information state of agents, and it has applications to modelling and reasoning about information-flow and information exchange between agents. This is a major problem in several fields such as secure communication where one has to deal with the privacy and authentication of communication protocols, Artificial Intelligence where agents are to be provided with reliable tools to reason about their environment and each other's knowledge, and e-commerce where agents need to have knowledge acquisition strategies over complex networks.
The standard approach to information flow in a multi-agent system has been presented in [8] but it does not present a formal description of epistemic programs and their updates. The first attempts to formalize such programs and updates were done by Plaza [21] , Gerbrandy and Groeneveld [12] , and Gerbrandy [10, 11] . However, they only studied a restricted class of epistemic programs. A general notion of epistemic programs and updates for DEL was introduced in [4, 5] . However, in this approach the underlying logic on propositions is boolean. For computational purposes one might want to relax this to an intuitionistic setting, hence conceiving propositions as being structured in a Heyting algebra. On the other hand, continuous lattices are also models of partiality of knowledge [9] , and are in general not distributive. Finally, actual physical computational situations such as quantum computation require (at least) a non-boolean setting.
In this paper we generalize 'boolean' DEL by introducing the notion of an abstract epistemic system. This generalization goes hand-in-hand with the introduction of non-determinism for states and actions and brings algebraic clarity to the semantics. The particular algebraic object which we introduce is a refinement of previously used objects tailored to study concurrency in computer science [1, 22] and the dynamics and interaction of physical systems [6] . Such an abstract epistemic system consists of a quantale É of epistemic programs, a É-right module Å of epistemic propositions, and each agent is encoded by an appearance map i.e. an endomorphism of the´Å Éµ-structure. We show that the boolean DEL of [5] is a concrete example of such an abstract epistemic system. The axioms of the modal operators follow immediately from abstract properties of quantales and modules over them. Crucial notions of DEL are definable abstractly and some new notions emerge naturally. The passage to a non-boolean theory also provides a new insight into epistemic programs such as public announcement and, of a surprisingly different status, public refutation. We sketch an analysis of the muddy children puzzle and of a cryptographic attack in our setting and also provide a motivating example for the passage to a non-boolean theory. We also provide a corresponding sequent calculus in which sequents will typically look like
where Ñ ½ Ñ are propositions, Õ ½ Õ Ð are actions and ½ Ò are agents which resolve into a single proposition or action AE. The fragment of the calculus restricted to actions is the Lambek calculus [18] , hence resource sensitive.
Epistemic propositions and epistemic programs
In this section we slightly recast and enrich the Dynamic Epistemic Logic of [5] in such a way that it enables a smooth passage to the algebraic setting to be introduced in Section 4. Part of this involves the introduction of non-determinism for both states and actions. As an example, 1 consider two players and a referee . In front of everybody, the referee throws a fair coin, catches it in his palm and fully covers it, before anybody (including himself) can see on which side the coin has landed. There are two possible states here, state × in which 'the coin lies Heads' up ( À ¾¨), hence ´×µ À , and state Ø in which the coin lies Tails up ( Ì ¾¨), hence ´Øµ Ì . We depict the state model ÌÓ×× as
For every agent there are arrows between any two states (including identical states), which means that nobody knows the 'real state'. We can also consider a case in which agents and can see the face of the coin, but agent cannot see it (although he knows that the others see it), so he is still uncertain if the coin is heads or tails. In this case only agent has several arrows between states whereas agents and have only one arrow in each state, which means that if the coin is heads up they know it and similarly for tails up. Hence PToss gets depicted as When a proposition È has exactly one state × ¾ È (i.e. È × is a singleton), we shall use systematic ambiguity, identifying the proposition with the state and writing e.g. È È .
Action models. Given a state model Ë, an action model over Ë is a triple ´¦ ¹ µ similar to a state model except that we think of the elements of ¦ as possible actions instead of possible states and the valuation ¦ È´Ëµ assigns to each action a precondition, i.e. a proposition ´ µ definining the domain of applicability of : action can happen in a state × iff × ¾ ´ µ ; e.g. a truthful announcement of a fact can only happen in those states where that fact holds. Note that since È´Ëµ is boolean we can equivalently consider the states at which the action cannot take place , denoted as Ã Ö´ µ Ë Ò ´ µ for each ¾ ¦. The effect of an action on states and appearance maps will be defined below in terms of an epistemic update product.
We introduce an action model over Toss. After catching the coin in his hand the referee might secretly take a peek at the coin before covering it while nobody notices this. The action model is now depicted as À À » » À À where stands for 'cheating' and for 'nothing happens' and ´ µ × Ø . The action model can be refined when replacing by À and Ì where ´ À µ À and ´ Ì µ Ì , specifying what the referee saw in case of deceit: The union in the definition of maps for programs says that an epistemic program is applicable where at least one of its actions is applicable. This makes the Ã Ö map follow contravariantly by boolean negation i.e. Ã Ö´ µ Ë Ò ´ µ. Epistemic programs introduce non-determinism: whenever ½ ¾ then ¾ is obtained from ½ by increasing nondeterminism; ½ ¾ stands for "either action ½ or action ¾ takes place".
In our example with actions À , Ì and the epistemic program À Ì stands for the non-deterministic action , in the sense that the outcome of the toss can be either. We depict the program over an action by double-circling the including actions. Hence the picture of the program À Ì over
As in the case of states and propositions, we use systematic ambiguity to identify deterministic programs with their unique undferlying action . 
The proposition È ª provides the strongest postcondition for È with respect to epistemic program : for each state in È ª the proposition È holds before running the . It can be seen that È ª iff È ´ µ , where is the falsum (i.e. the trivially false epistemic proposition over Ë).
Modalities. We define the epistemic modality for each agent ¾ as the unary connective which assigns to proposition È Ë over Ë another proposition
We read £ È as 'agent knows or believes È '. 3 We define the dynamic modality for each epistemic program over È as the unary connective which assigns to proposition È Ë over Ë another proposition ℄È
Note that (as mentioned before) some states × ¾ Ë can be themselves pairs of states and actionś × µ which make the above definition well defined. The proposition ℄È provides the weakest precondition for È with respect to the epistemic program : for each state in ℄È the proposition È holds after running . 
Again note that ¦ ½¯¦¾ and ¦ ½ (or ¦ ¾ ) are not necessarily disjoint. 4 The action model over a state model Ë contains an action skip in which nothing happens iff 5 skip skip skip Ë È´Ëµ ´skipµ skip
Notice the use of systematic ambiguity: we denoted with the same name (skip ) both the program skip and its only action. It is easy to see that skip is a unit, up to isomorphism, both for update product and sequential composition.
Definition 2.2
We define the sequential composition of two epistemic programs ½ over
Concrete epistemic systems.
We now have all the tools to make the passage of DEL in the sense of [5] to 'concrete epistemic systems' which we put forward as a stepping-stone towards 'abstract epistemic systems'. A DEL model is essentially one that is closed under update product and sequential composition (and contains a skip), while a concrete epistemic system consists of all the epistemic propositions and all the epistemic programs of a DEL model: 
The algebra of programs and propositions
A sup-lattice Ä is a complete lattice with maps which preserve arbitrary joins as homomorphism.
Recall that each sup-lattice also has arbitrary meets, namely ¾ Ä for any Ä. Hence the designation 'sup-lattice refers to the fact that we require structurepreserving maps only to preserve arbitrary joins (cf. the designations locales and frames for complete Heyting algebras [16] ). We denote bottom and top of Ä by and respectively and define its set of atoms as
and can be explicitly given as
The left Galois adjoint £ moreover preserves arbitrary meets. We denote an adjoint pair by £ £ . In computational terms, one can think of the left Galois adjoint £ as assigning weakest preconditions with respect to the program £ .
A quantale 6 is a sup-lattice É equipped with a monoid structure´É ¯ ½µ satisfying
Hence for all ¾ É the maps ¯ É É and ¯ É É preserve arbitrary joins and hence they have Galois adjoints´ ¯ µ ´ Ò µ and´ ¯ µ ´ µ explicitly given by Ò ¾ É ¯ ¾ É ¯ We refer to´ Ò µ and´ µ as the residual operations. A quantale homomorphism is both a sup-homomorphism and a monoid-homomorphism. Examples of quantales are: the set ×ÙÔ´Äµ of all sup-endomorphisms of a complete lattice Ä ordered pointwisely; the set of all relations from a set to itself ordered by pointwise inclusion -this quantale is isomorphic to ×ÙÔ´È´ µµ; the powerset of any monoid with composition extended by continuity.
A É-right module for a quantale É is a sup-lattice Å which goes equipped with a module
As for some examples, a quantale É is a É-right module over itself with composition as the tensor and a complete lattice Ä is a ×ÙÔ´Äµ-right module with function application as the tensor.
Definition 3.1 [1]
A system is a pair´Å Éµ with É a quantale and Å a É-right module.
A system is atomistic when both Å and É are atomistic and the following equations hold
These conditions can be interpreted as the fact that 'the atoms of both the quantale and the module behave deterministically'. 
If´È µ is a coherent pair then we have ´È ª µ ´È µ ª ´ µ Proposition 3.6 i. For ¾ the right Galois adjoint to appearance Ë ´ µ È´Ëµ È´Ëµ is knowledge £ Ë (=the epistemic modality). ii. For ¾ È´¦µ the right Galois adjoint to update ª È´Ëµ È´Ëµ is the dynamic modality ℄ . iii. The right Galois adjoint to appearance ¦ ´ µ È´¦µ È´¦µ introduces an epistemic modality £ ¦ on actions. iv. The right Galois adjoint to left-and right-composition ¯ ¯ È´¦µ È´¦µ introduce respectively weakest pre-specification Ò and strongest post-specification , and the right Galois adjoint to È ª È´¦µ È´Ëµ introduces Ñ , a variant on this. 8 Proof. All follows by construction and basic facts on sets, cartesian products and relations. ¾
Abstract epistemic systems
The propositions of the previous section lead us to the following definitions.
where Å is a sup-homomorphism, É is a quantale homomorphism and Å´Ñ ª Õµ Å´Ñ µ ª É´Õ µ (1) for all Ñ ¾ Å and Õ ¾ É. actions. The satisfaction relation is included in the partial ordering of Å: for a state Ñ ¾ Å and fact ³ ¾ ËØ ´Éµ we have Ñ ³¸Ñ ³. All modalities and other right Galois adjoints discussed and introduced in Proposition 3.6 arise also here as right Galois adjoints and hence there interpretation still holds e.g. "knowledge £ Å is the adjoint to appearance Å ". 8 The residual Ò assigns to its argument AE the weakest program Ò AE which one has to effectuate after effectuating such that the net effect is below AE. The residual assigns to its argument AE the strongest program AE which one has to effectuate before effectuating such that the net effect is below AE. The right Galois adjoint does Ñ assigns to its argument AE the weakest proposition Ñ È before effectuating which guarantees È after. For a discussion on pre-and post-specification we refer to [7, 15] . Nature of the modalities. We identify the basic properties of the modalities. 
Since £ Å is a right Galois adjoint it preserves arbitrary meets, that is £ Å ´Î Ñ µ Î £ Å Ñ , and hence it preserves the empty meet and binary meets, and is monotone. ¾ Since all other modalities preserve arbitrary meets the same result holds for them and for all other right Galois adjoints. In an intuitionistic context where one might take Å to be a frame (i.e. a (complete) Heyting algebra with sup-homomorphisms) we can internalize the partial order using the defining property of a Heyting algebra so we obtain
Hence in the special case that É ½ and £ we obtain the intuitionistic modal logic ÁÒØÃ £ of [26] . We conclude that intuitionistic epistemic systems, that is epistemic systems for which Å is a frame, generalize intuitionistic modal logic to multiple agents and dynamics in terms of epistemic programs. If Å is moreover a complete boolean algebra such as the powerset of Section 2 then Kripke's axiom K follows i.e.
£ Å ´Ñ Ñ ¼ µ ´£ Å Ñ £ Å Ñ ¼ µ
Diamonds and corresponding rules arise in that case by duality.
Learning. The fact that eq(1) in definition 4.1 is an inequality expresses learning of agents. Some of the clauses of the appearance of an agent on an update product might get eliminated from the left hand side of eq(1) simply because some of the sub-action of the program might not be applicable on some of the sub-states of the proposition. This implies that the agent learns something new as the result of update (left hand side is stronger than the right hand side). We can also force the equality by introducing the notion of coherence: , and for which Ã Ö´Õµ Ñ.
Private refutation to subgroup This is also a program that privately refutes a proposition
Ñ to the subgroup ¬ of agents. Ã Ö´Õµ is the same as before and ´Õµ ¾¬ Õ and ´Õµ ¾ Ò¬ ½, that is:
3. Failure test of a proposition Ñ is a program Õ that tests when Ñ fails. It is a particular case of private refutation where Ñ is refuted to an empty set of agents Ã Ö´Õµ Ñ and ´Õµ ¾ ½, that is:
. Public announcement is also definable in our setting. However, while "being not in the precondition of Õ" is a proposition in Å for all Õ ¾ É, this is not the case for "being in the precondition of Õ". To see this consider the lattice with Õ such that Ã Ö´Õµ where in the language of Section 2 we have ´Õµ , which can not be represented by a single element of Å. The reason for this is that this lattice is non-boolean. Hence public announcement of the proposition Ñ ¾ Å is an epistemic program Õ ¾ É for which ´Õµ Õ and for which Ï Ã Ö´Õµ has a boolean complement Ï Ã Ö´Õµµ , satisfying´Ï Ã Ö´Õµµ Ñ.
We now present some case studies. Given an epistemic system´Å É µ ¾ on which we impose particular conditions which encode the desired state and action models.
Cheating. Consider the 'cheating' scenario of the first section where the set of agents is . Recall that there are two possibilities in the state model Toss, × in which the coin is Heads up and Ø in which it is Tails up. We model this abstractly by assuming as given an epistemic system´Å Éµ, with × Ø ¾ Å and À ¾ É. The facts are encoded as stabilizers, i, e. we are given propositions À Ì ¾ ËØ ´Éµ. All these are assumed to satisfy the following conditions: ´×µ ´Øµ × Ø for all ¾ × À Ø Ì À Ì ; the epistemic program À ¾ É has maps ´ À µ ´ À µ ½ and ´ À µ À , and kernel Ã Ö´ À µ Ø.
This program describes an instance of cheating where the coin is heads up. × ª À ¾ Å is the proposition × after it is updated by À .
Let us reason about this scenario, using our algebraic setting, e. to prove that ×ª À £ À.
Indeed by ¾ being system homomorphisms and eq(1) we have ´× ª À µ ´×µ ª ´ À µ ´× Øµ ª ½ × Ø and the same goes for . On the other hand ´× ª À µ ´×µ ª ´ À µ ´× Øµ ª À ´× ª À µ ´Ø ª À µ × ª À since Ø ¾ Ã Ö´ À µ. We have × À iff × ª À À ª À and by the definition of ËØ ´Éµ we get × ª À À. Thus ´× ª À µ À and by adjunction we get × ª À £ À which means after updating his initial state by taking a peek, the referee knows that the coin is heads up.
If the referee is honest he uncovers the coin without taking a peek. He then publicly refutes the 'coin being tails'. The epistemic program in this case is the public refutation of proposition Ø where ´Õµ ´Õµ ´Õµ Õ and Ã Ö´Õµ Ø . It follows that × ª Õ £ À, and the same goes for and . Hence all the agents know that the coin is Heads up after the public refutation.
The muddy children puzzle. We refer the reader for the details of the general case to [8] . Here we discuss the case of three children playing in the mud with and having muddy foreheads. Their father publicly announces that at least one of them has mud on his forehead and asks once if they know that they are dirty. After they all simultaneously reply "No!" once, the muddy children and will know that they are muddy. This simple case has only one round (since the number of dirty children is 2), but the general case with dirty children shall have ½ rounds of "No!" replies. As before, we model this by postulating as given an epistemic system´Å Éµ. 
The first disjunct is given by the assumptions × Note that this proof can be straightforwardlly extended to the general case by induction on the number of dirty children.
A cryptographic attack. Two agents and share a secret key so that they can send each other encrypted messages over some communication channel. The channel is not secure: some outsider may interpret the messages or prevent them from being delivered (although he cannot read them because he does not have the key). Suppose the encryption method is publicly known but the key is secret. It is also known that is the only one who knows an important secret for example if some fact È holds or not. Suppose now that sends an encrypted message to communicating the secret. gets the message and he is convinced that it must be authentic. Now both and are convinced that they share the secret and that doesn't. However suppose that notices two features of the specific encryption method: first that the shape of the encrypted message can show whether it contains a secret or it is just junk, second that without knowing the key or the content of the message he can modify the encrypted message to its opposite i.e. if it originally said È hold, it will now say that È does not hold. Now the outsider will secretly intercept the message, change it appropriately and send it to without knowing the secret. Now and mistakenly believe that they share the secret, while in fact got the wrong secret instead! has succeeded to manipulate their beliefs.
We can encode this situation in an epistemic system. The agents include . Let × Ø ¾ Å satisfy × È and Ø ¢ È . The only agent that knows if È holds or not is thus ´×µ × and similarly ´Øµ Ø. On the other hand and do not know this so ´×µ ´×µ ´Øµ ´Øµ × Ø. Call the message in which È holds È and the one in which it does not hold È . The epistemic actions that correspond to the cryptographic attack are the following: « in which the message È is intercepted, modified and sent to , ¬ in which the message È is intercepted, modified and sent to , « ¼ in which sends the message È to , ¬ ¼ in which sends the message È to , and finally which corresponds to sending a junk message. Thus « ¬ « ¼ ¬ ¼ É and È È ¾ ËØ ´Éµ and È È È È . In actions « and ¬ agent is uncertain about which message È or È has been sent so ´«µ ´¬µ « ¬. On the other hand, agent is sure that he has sent a message (either that È holds or that it doesn't) to and that has received exactly the same secret i.e. ´«µ « ¼ and ´¬µ ¬ ¼ . However if È has been sent, has received È so ´«µ ¬ ¼ and the other way around ´¬µ « ¼ .
also considers possible that only a junk message has been sent and that is why he sees while in « ¼ and ¬ ¼ . If a junk message has been sent, and are sure about it ´µ ´µ while is unsure if it was a junk message or È or È , thus ´µ « ¼ ¬ ¼ . The kernel of each action is the states which they cannot be applied to i.e. Ã Ö´«µ Ã Ö´« ¼ µ È and Ã Ö´¬µ Ã Ö´¬ ¼ µ È . The epistemic program « ¬ expresses the action of communicating the secret È or È in the above scenario. Now let us update the state × with the epistemic program « ¬ and show that after update, if È holds, then knows that knows that È holds i.e. × ª´« ¬µ ¾ ¾ È . Since this is equal to´× ª «µ ´× ª ¬µ ¾ ¾ È and × È ¾ Ã Ö´¬µ we get × ª ¬ , so it suffices to show that × ª « ¾ ¾ È . By adjunction ´ ´× ª «µµ È . By eq (1) 
A non-boolean example. An intuitive example of an epistemic system´Å É µ ¾ where refutations are first class citizens rather than announcements is the refutation of theories in scientific practice. Hence the underlying lattice Å is naturally non-boolean. Let the elements of the module Å be theories written in some logical language e.g. DEL; a theory being a consistent set of sentences closed under logical deduction. For obvious reasons negating a theory Ø ¾ Å is in general itself not a theory -algebraically a theory should be conceived as a filter. The join in Å is the intersection of the sentences belonging to the corresponding theories while the meet is the closure of their union. The quantale É consists of experiments performed by (groups of) agents in order to check some testable consequences of theories. This experiment might be public or private, and some of the outsiders might be deluded into rejecting, misunderstanding or misinterpreting the outcome. 9 The appearance Å ´Ñµ of a theory to an agent can be thought of as the agent's interpretation of the theory Ñ, and similarly the appearance É ´Õµ is the agent's interpretation of the outcome of an experiment Õ. Following Popper's conception, a positive result of an experiment cannot provide a proof of a theory but a negative one provides a falsification of the theory, hence we can refute it. For each such refutation Ö ¾ É we have a kernel Ã Ö´Öµ ¾ Å which tells us which theories can be refuted, namely those which satisfy Ø ª Ö .
The sequent calculus of epistemic systems
We define the objects of our sequent calculus by mutual induction on two sets, the set of formulas denoted as Ñ ¾ Ä Å and the set of epistemic programs denoted as Õ ¾ Ä É , respectively
where is in the set of agents, Ô is in the set¨of facts, × is in a set Î Å of atomic propositional variables, and is in a set Î É of atomic action variables. We denote by Ä Å the set of all Ñformulas, Ä É the set of all Õ-formulas, and the set of agents. We have two kinds of sequents, Å-sequents Å AE where ¾´Ä Å Ä É µ £ and AE ¾ Ä Å Ä É , and É-sequents É AE where ¾´Ä É µ £ and AE ¾ Ä É . To describe what these sequents mean, we extend the notation to two operations 
Define a satisfaction relation on Ä Å as Ñ Ñ ¼¸Ñ Ñ ¼ , similarly on Ä É we define Õ Õ ¼¸Õ Õ ¼ , and finally on both as 11 Ñ Õ¸´Ñ Õµ coherent and Õ Now a sequent AE (for either Å or É ) is said to be valid iff Â AE. We also allow sequents with empty consequents, denoted as . We interpret such a sequent as being equivalent to , or in other words Â . 9 E.g. arguments for Darwinism such as the discovery of fossils are interpreted by creationists as "the fossils have been put in place by God". 10 Note that the top element of Å is the unit for Â on Å (i.e. ) and that the unit element of É (i.e. 1) is the unit for Â on É (i.e.¯) 11 For the definition of coherence refer to definition 4.4 The meaning of a sequent. To provide the reader with a way to "read" our sequents, we can express the intuitive meaning of a sequent AE in the following inductive manner: Å AE means that agent knows, or believes, that Å AE holds. So this captures features of 's own reasoning: the sequent Å AE is accepted by as a valid argument. Õ Å AE means that, after action Õ happens, the sequent Å AE will hold. Ñ Å AE means that, in context Ñ (i.e. in any situation in which Ñ is true), the sequent Å AE must hold. É AE means that AE is a tautology which implies that each agent (with no assumption) knows all the tautologies (i.e. the necessitation rule of classical modal logic).
Finally, Õ É AE simply means that the sequent Õ¯ É AE holds.
For instance, the sequent Ñ Õ Ñ ¼ Å Ñ ¼¼ can be read as: in context Ñ, agent believes that after action Õ agent will believe that, in context Ñ ¼ , proposition Ñ ¼¼ must hold .
This reading shows that our sequent calculus expresses two forms of resource sensitivity. One is the use-once form of linear logic [13] that comes from the quantale structure on epistemic programs. This, as will be seen later, is encoded in the Lambek calculus rules on É-sequents.
One could call these dynamic resources . The other form deals with epistemic resources : the resources available to each agent that enable him to reason in a certain way (i.e. to deduct a result from some assumptions). These resources are encoded in the way the context appears to the agent in sequents, for instance in the sequent ¼ Å AE is the context and hence the ´ µ is the resource that enables agent to do the ¼ Å AE reasoning. Note that ¼ Å AE might not be a valid sequent in the context , but it is valid in the context given by 's appearance to agent . To summerize, in our setting not only propositions, but also actions and agents are treated as resources (available or not for other actions or for reasoning of other agents).
Sequent rules.
The axioms for identity and and are the same as in any sequent calculus.
The operational rules for Å-sequents are Õ Å Ñ Å Õ℄Ñ We can add one additional rule specifically for strong epistemic systems: 12 Õ Å Ñ Å Õ ´Õµ Å Ñ Soundness. One verifies that these rules are sound with regard to the model of section 4. Concerns about completeness constitute on-going work.
Conclusion and elaborations
We have developed an algebraic axiomatics in terms of a simple mathematical object: a suplattice Å, which encodes states, epistemic propositions as well as facts; a quantale É (acting on Å) which encodes update by epistemic programs; and a family of endomorphisms of thé Å É Ï Å Ï É ª ¯ ½µ-structure encoding the agents in terms of their epistemic modalities.
From this structure many useful other modalities arise, including dynamic modalities and residuals. This algebraic axiomatics generalizes Dynamic Epistemic Logic to non-boolean settings, while still capturing the same concepts. Furthermore it provides an algebraic way of dealing with epistemic scenarios such as the muddy children puzzle. We list some possible further elaborations on this line of thought.
We would like to have a more refined version of Theorem 4.6, one which exposes alternative but concrete variations on Dynamic Epistemic Logic which it then axiomatically classifies.
Also of interest would be investigations towards blending this algebraic approach with coalgebraic epistemic features which are currently intensively studied e.g. [3] .
Part of the motivation of this work was a marriage of epistemics and resource-sensitivity [19] . Although we only contributed in a very limited fashion to such a project in this paper (quantales provide a semantics for non-commutative linear logic and hence we obtain a linear structure on epistemic programs) it would be interesting to obtain a better handle on resources in our model.
Each system´Å Éµ can be equivalently represented as a É-enriched category [24] . This would allow a passage from a dynamic epistemic theory of programs to one about program transformations when substituting the quantale by a one-object biclosed bicategory -a quantale is a one-object biclosed bicategory which is locally thin. The two-cells in the bicategory would then encode the program transformations.
